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The states were disadvantaged by joining the Federation in 1901.
They surrendered their incomes derived mainly from customs and
excise to the new Commonwealth and received back 75 per cent of
it. But after 1910 that amount was withdrawn and they had to accept
25 shillings per head. The loans they had been accustomed to raise
since the 1880s either locally or in London assisted in keeping their
economies afloat through providing employment on various public
works programmes. But the war removed even that thin line of
support as the Commonwealth took over aBloan raisings to fund the
war. Most states other than NSW agreed not to raise loans causing
an increase in the numbers of unemployed. In the early stages of the
war, funds were lent by Britain to the Commonwealth to assist in
war mobilisation some of which was lent to the states. The British
funds were not sent to Australia; a credit was created in the
Commonwealth Bank in London and, to the horror of orthodox
economists, additional notes were printed by the Treasury's Note
Issuing Branch in Australia with a promise that they would be
redeemed at the end of the war. The Commonwealth established a
war-time loan council to distribute these British funds and raise new
loans in Australia. NSW continued to raise loans in London, much
to the Commonwealth's annoyance, because it wished to maintain
strong employment levels through its public works programme. The
war cost nearly £400 million and the Hughes National government
in 1920 sought to re-establish this loan council as a measure for
assisting in the loan renewals and repayments. The Commonwealth
wished to have the states avoid conducting their borrowing
programmes when the Commonwealth was renewing its war-time
loans. Hughes was replaced by S.M. Bruce in January 1923 and Dr
Earle Page became his Treasurer. They embarked on a programme
to curtail the borrowings by the states. They argued that money
invested by private corporations was done more efficiently and
effectively than if a government invested the same money in
infrastructural developments. NSW had not joined the war-time loan
council but when Fuller was Premier he enrolled the state in Bruce's
loan council.

Government Versus Private Investment
At the first meeting of this council on 1 February 1924, Dr Page
announced that 'borrowings in the past have been much too heavy,
and that the demands of the Governments for loans have resulted in
a more or less complete absorption of available funds'. Page produced
no evidence to substantiate these claims, but proposed the novel
policy of pegging increases in loan raisings to population increases.
He thereby ignored the fact that it was the requirements for funding
essential infrastructure that set the level of loan raisings. Dr Page
repeated his credo that 'In my opinion, it is imperative to reduce
Government borrowing greatly'. In a further move to curtail loanfunded public works he proposed that all municipal and local
government bodies have their loan raising capacities curtailed by
having the state governments legislate for them to be subject to the
authority ofthe new Loan Council. He declared that he would' leave
all accumulation of wealth in Australia for the benefit of private
enterprise'. 1 His shock tactics worked and when the state
Treasurers assembled the next day they meekly agreed to Dr
Page's three-point plan. This provided that they would refrain

from borrowing when the Commonwealth was renewing its loans;
they would authorise the Council to determine the time and method
of placing all loans and; they would agree to an interest rate of six
per cent (an increase of half a per cent on existing rates) with a
maximum term often years. By such measures, the states surrendered
their capacity to raise loans for the funding of their state economies.

Ramifications of Establishment of the Temporary loan
Council
The disadvantage of the loan council was that the initiative to raise
loans rested with the council and not, as it had previously done, with
the state treasuries or their Agents-General in London. The loan
council was to borrow under its own name and then divide the amount
among the states on an agreed basis. Lacking the same enthusiasm
and drive of the state treasuries, the new council would be unable to
maintain a continual flow of borrowings and renewals. Some in the
NSW government saw a threat to the state's autonomy in Dr Page's
new council. The NSW Treasurer in the Fuller Nationalist
government, Sir Arthur Cocks, attacked Dr Page's programme for
its' gradual encroachment of the Federal Ministry upon the sovereign
rights of the States'. He referred to Deakin's comments made when
the constitution was being written about how the 'power of the purse
in Great Britain by degrees established the authority of the
Commons'. Cocks described a similar situation arising locally, 'If a
change of government in Australia is advisable', [ie switching to a
unitary state] remarked Sir Arthur Cocks, 'surely it should be dealt
with by a straight-out declaration of policy, rather than by the
insidious system squeeze, restriction and suppression by the Federal
Ministry which renders the position of every State almost, if not
quite, intolerable'.2
Having enrolled his state in the loan council from early in 1924,
Fuller discovered too late that he had chosen the wrong financial
path to save his government from electoral defeat. Bluffed by Dr
Page's plea to suspend all loans in order to give preference to the
Commonwealth's loan conversion processes, Fuller soon found that
the reduction in funds produced unemployment and disenchantment
among his voters with the slowing of the local economy. Fortunately
for him, he was able to raise a London loan of £6 million in new
money in May 1924. This money was not to be brought to Sydney;
it was to be used for paying the goods and services obtained in Britain
for the NSW government. But Fuller arranged for these funds to be
transmitted to Sydney in spite of the large bank charges this incurred.
These London funds were too little and came too late to help him
win the general elections on 30 May 1925. The electors swung to
support the Labor party for office under J.T. Lang giving him a thin
majority of two seats. Bruce and Page were now to confront a Labor
Premier who challenged their ideas about reducing government
investment in the national economy and curtailing the financial
powers of the states.

The Election of the lang Labor Government
Lang owed his electoral success more to the promise to legislate for
a 44-hour working week and for pensions for widows and
orphans rather than his intention to keep NSW free of Dr
Page's loan council and deflationary policy. One of his earliest

actions as Premier was to withdraw NSW from the loan council. He
announced that the council reduced the opportunity for NSW to obtain
the amounts sufficient to meet its public works programme and that
the market was more prepared to lend in small amounts to individual
states than in one large sum to the Commonwealth.] 'The comments
of Dr. Page,' he remarked, 'bear out my contention that a limitation
would be placed on necessary borrowings, which would considerably
hamper the Treasurer and seriously affect the State Government's
developmental policy much to the detriment of New South Wales'.4
Lang's condemnation of the council and electoral back-lash
against Fuller's deflationary policies made an impact on Dr Page. At
its meeting in Melbourne on 16 and 17 June 1925, Dr Page was
much more conciliatory and agreed to raise the very much larger
loan of £45,481,000 of which £10 million was nominally allocated
to NSW. The possibility of the Commonwealth borrowing in the
USA was to be explored.
The loan council sought to have Lang join their number. It
delegated W.N. Gillies, the Premier and Treasurer of Queensland, to
visit Lang when returning to Brisbane. But Gillies was ill by the
time his train reached Sydney and while Lang went to Central station
to met him nothing ensued. s Dr Page then took up the negotiations
with Lang who responded by adopting a policy of mediation towards
the council. Page's strategy remained one of stopping local loan
raising to make way for the conversion of the £68 million war loan
and to borrow money for the states from London or the US. He sought
£20 million from overseas and wished to establish a consortium of
banks for this borrowing in London instead of conj ointly employing
Nivisons and the Commonwealth Bank. 6 Nivisons were the loan
brokers for all the states.
These proposals of Dr Page were adopted by the loan council at
its meeting in Melbourne on 6 and 7 July 1925. Lang seemed willing
to attend this meeting and sent his apologies with the message that
he would 'be glad however to consider question [of] co-operation
[in] any decision arrived at'.7 Page explained his London strategy to
Lang after this meeting and Lang requested copies of cables
exchanged between the Commonwealth government, the loan
council, the Bank of England, Nivisons the British Treasury. On
receiving these, Lang replied that he would consider the situation
and prepare a 'definite reply as to the attitude of this State'. 8 Page
decided to proceed with a loan of £15 million in New York and
another in London of £5 million. This sum of £20,411,486 was to be
used to payoff the overdrafts incurred in London by the states and
to meet the payment of the states' purchases in Britain. No funds
were to be remitted to Australia and the states were to use their
revenues to fund the public works programmes. Given the lack of
such revenues, this decision was tantamount to a significant reduction
in such programmes. Lang refused to share in Dr Page's borrowing
arrangements saying that sufficient money could be raised in London
by NSW and that 'it will be a mistaken policy to break the long
tradition of Australian financial connection with London on account
of a temporary difficulty that may disappear a few months hence'.9
This policy was soon after to be abandoned when Lang found that
the 'temporary difficulty' was to be more long lasting than he had
anticipated.

'Bringing the States [More] to Heel'
In discussing the constitution in 1902, Alfred Deakin predicted that
the states would lose their financial independence to the
Commonwealth. He described the situation of states losing theri
financial autonomy as on of them having to be 'brought to heel'.
And this was seeming to become the reality by the mid 1920s
under the plans of Bruce and Page. While the previous changes
under which the states had their financial wings clipped may

have been economically disadvantaging for the states, the process
was slow and predictable. But under Dr Page, such changes were to
be more sudden and thorough. His innovations were so efficiently
planned that the states were unable to mount practicable defences
against them.
Bruce and Page promoted policies that reflected political
relationships expressed in terms of 'them and us'. Rather than seeing
the Australian people as being governed by two differing
administrations (the states and the Commonwealth) that should
cooperatively attend to the people's needs, the two men viewed them
as separate political bodies. They considered the Commonwealth's
revenue (principally customs and excise) as its own and not to be
shared with the states. They believed that the states should fund their
obligations by revenues raised through their own income taxes and
other measures. This new approach by Bruce and Page to national
financing was directly linked to their concern about loan raisings
and the growth of state enterprises. The guarantee of income through
the provision by the Commonwealth of payments to the states of 25
shillings per head was perceived by Bruce and Page as a means for
the states being wrongly encouraging to undertake activities that
these men opposed. Stopping the per capita payments, Bruce and
Page believed, would curtail the state's ability to undertake such
schemes. This would place a 'salutary check' on the states' activities.
'The States', declared Prime Minister Bruce, 'have not that financial
independence which is essential to good government, and there is
not such a salutary check on expenditure as would be the case if the
States themselves had to raise all the revenues they require.'lo Dr
Page disliked the continuing existence of the states. He favoured the
elimination of state boundaries and boldly declared how they should
be redrawn on the following impracticable principles:
Give the Commonwealth complete control of immigration, federalize
the Crown lands, subdivide the States into provinces whose outlines
are detennined solely by the lines of community of interests, big
enough to attack national schemes in a large way, but small enough
for every legislator to be thoroughly conversant with every portion
of the area, and land settlement and proper development will naturally
follow. II
The fundamental question arises in the progression of these events
of why Bruce and Page forced these crucial changes on an unwilling
political coalition and a reluctant Parliament in March 1927.
Indications were that a long-term plan had been formulated by Bruce
and Page in which this denial of the per capita payment was the
initial stage in a longer term programme for 'bringing the states to
heel'. Lang was aware of these plans and hoped to preserve NSW
from their effects by remaining out of the loan council and borrowing
independently both locally and overseas.

The Economic Policies of the Lang Labor Party

1925-27
In spite of Lang having a slim majority of two seats (providing a
speaker reduced this to one) from the general elections in May 1925,
his government set about two innovative political programmes. One
was to expand the existing small social welfare system by introducing
a scheme of widows' pensions and child endowment, but all on a
limited scale. The other was to raise the loan funded works
programme to the level of previous years. These called for increased
government spending and expanded loan raisings. Lang also
established the Government Insurance Office mainly to provide lower
premiums for workers' compensation insurance. Lang had increased
the compensation for injured workers to which the insurance
companies had responded by raising their premiums to
excessive levels. The Government Insurance Office was a
measure for forcing down those premiums and providing

cheaper insurance. 12 Lang also adopted new measures for increasing
revenue to offset the government's increased expenditures. One bold
innovation that won him more enemies in high places was the
introduction of a tax of 0.5 pence per copy on those newspapers
with circulations exceeding 15,000. 13 The p Ian raised to even greater
levels the anger ofthe newspaper owners against Lang. The law was
challenged by the newspaper owners in the High Court and it was
declared to be invalid because it was considered to be an excise.
Lang increased the loan funded public works programme for
1925 by £2.5 million over the £ 11,255,190 proposed by the defeated
Fuller government. Some of this loan money (estimated to be
£700,000) was to be spent on expanding the state's education facilities
such as the building of new schools, teachers' houses and agricultural
colleges. Lang had already promised the abolition of high school
fees as part of this programme of widening the availability of
education. Railway construction work was seen by Lang as an
important means for absorbing the unemployed workers and the Chief
Railway Commissioner, James Fraser, was asked to speed up such
works with emphasis on the Sydney underground network. Fraser
sought to expand employment on the electrification of the main
suburban line in the vicinity of Homebush and Strathfield that would
employ 500 men. This plan would produce immediate revenue
whereas work on the underground, although employing many men,
would not be completed for some years. Lang replied to Fraser
through his Under Secretary, C.R. Chapman, asking for the tunnelling
to continue even though it would delay increased revenue. He
suggested that another 500 men could be employed on the section
between St James station and Circular Quay. 14 Loans were raised by
the Lang government in London for £4 million and in Sydney for
£ 11 ,581 ,903. The Sydney funds were raised by the sale of government
stock to the Government Savings Bank, the State Superannuation
Board and two life insurance companies, MLC Assurance and the
AMP SocietyY
NSW's abstention from the loan council continued to annoy the
press and the Commonwealth government. Officials in the
Commonwealth Treasury suggested holding the next loan council
meeting in Sydney to attract Lang back to the fold, but it was not
implemented. The council's meeting of 18 August in Melbourne
regretted the absence of NSW and it agreed to inform the London
underwriters that NSW should not be given more favourable access
to the market than those governments joining in the loan counci1. 16
Rebutting Lang's claim that the Council would limit his government's
loans, the Council declared ambiguously that membership of it
'preserved absolute freedom to every State, except in so far as its
government may voluntarily bind itself to Council's decision'. I?
Meanwhile Lang discovered that of a recent loan raised by the
council, £928,380 was subscribed from NSW. 'One can understand',
he remarked, 'how other States welcome the constitution of the Loan
Council when New South Wales is able to subscribe the best part of
a million pounds to a loan raised for the purpose of financing public
works in other States'. 18 The event demonstrated that private and
corporate investors were prepared to buy government stock rather
than chance their money in the less secure private investments in
which Dr Page and his commercial friends wished to see it invested.
Lang was able to demonstrate that the costs of raising the council
loans far exceeded that for NSW loans. His Treasury figures showed
that the recent council loan cost NSW l6s.8d. per cent whereas
NSW's loans cost 7s.6d. per cent. The added costs were due to the
Commonwealth engaging the banks to underwrite the loan and they
demanded that the loan be at a low price to ensure its ready sale.
NSW's loans were not underwritten. 19
Like the previous Nationalist government, Lang lost few
opportunities to assert the advantages ofloan-funded public

works for the State's economy and for employment. In his budget
speech he pointed out that 'It would practically be impossible to
construct public works out of revenue. If loans were not raised the
development of the state would remain at a standstill. Unemployment
would eventuate, and assume large proportions, if public works were
not proceeded with'. He agreed that, 'Some of the public works do
not directly contribute to the revenue, and in some instances do not
produce sufficient revenue to meet the whole of the interest on the
outlay; [but] they must be regarded as national necessities, the capital
value of which is at least equivalent to the amount expended out of
loan funds'.20 Lang and his early-Keynesian ideas were never
confronted by his opponents. Their tactics instead were to condemn
loan-funded investments for the increase they caused to the national
debt and never for the economic stimulus nor for the increased
employment and consumption they created. These negative ideas
became an item of economic faith with such critics. When
governments adopted the arguments of these economic pundits by
reducing the loan raisings and cutting the public works programmes
during the Great Depression, extensive unemployment ensued. In
spite of such demonstrations, the financial pedants steadfastly refused
to accept the causal economic link between the expenditure ofloan
funds and the increased employment and related prosperity.

British Financiers' Attitudes Towards NSW
NSW political affairs were widely reported in London. Lang's
controversial attempts to have the Legislative Council abolished by
persuading the Governor, Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, to appoint
additional Labor Councillors to act as a 'suicide squad' to do the job
was published in detaiJ.21 The sequel, when some of the 'suiciders'
changed their minds and held on to their seats, was equally as well
publicised. 22 Fortunately the government's Attorney-General, Edward
McTiernan, was then in London and could keep Lang informed. He
reported on the hostility of the Bank of England and particularly its
Governor, Montague Norman, towards NSW. This he acknowledged
as being due to NSW, some time previously, transferring its business
from the Bank of England to the London County Bank and the
Westminster Bank. It started a trend that other Australian states
followed. Norman, he reported, enjoyed close connections with the
London press, particularly the London Times and hinted that he
fuelled the hostility towards NSW. 23
Indeed Norman took a close interest in Australian financial
affairs. In June 1925 he had an argument with Lord Glendyne of
Nivisons (NSW's London loans broker) saying that Australia should
borrow from the US say 80 per cent but place the balance of20 per
cent with the London market. Norman also said that the states should
borrow only through the Commonwealth government. Nivisons
opposed him on all these points having already expressed opposition
to the loan council concept. The Commonwealth Bank's London
Branch was involved in these arguments and urged Norman to express
his plans to Joseph Cook the Australian High Commissioner in
London for transmission to the Commonwealth government, which
he accordingly did. 24 The British government was also concerned at
the rate of lending in colonial and foreign loans and reviewed the
matter over three weeks in October 1925.25 With Britain returning to
the gold standard and purchasing large quantities of gold from
overseas and with general savings and investments falling to lower
rates than previously on account of the depleted economy, there was
a signalling from London that the Australian-British financial
relations would face troubled times. The Australian experts,
unfortunately, did not identify these significant portents of decline
at that stage.
Attacks on Australia's borrowings were mounted from
other sources. British overseas lending (particularly to
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Australia) was censured in a pamphlet published in October 1926
by S.R. Cooke and E.H. Davenport titled Australian Finance. Its
tenor was stamped on the first page: 'In the whole British Empire
there is no more voracious borrower than the Australian
Commonwealth' it artlessly declared. NSW was condemned for
'demanding £4,000,000 from the British investor' when it had already
spent the money and wanted a loan to 'repay the State's banker'. It
had been the established custom for 30 years for all states to maintain
overdrafts with their London bankers and then repay the overdraft
after a year by raising a loan. Such established banking practices
were brashly ignored by the authors in their targetting of Australia.
Nor did the authors explain that these British loans were spent on
British consumer goods (exported to Australia) and services and that
little money actually left British shores. Sensationalism and distortion
were the pamphlet's twin aims. Using the latest Australian statistics,
the authors demonstrated that the 'visible wealth' of Australia was
£2,823,000,000 in 1921 and that the total net debt of £828,000,000.
This represented 30 per cent of the value of that wealth, said the
authors, while failing to mention that much of the loan stock was
held by Australians. A particular concern of the authors was that
some of the loan money might be used for government enterprises
such as the Commonwealth Shipping Line or the Commonwealth
Oil Refineries both of which competed against British companies.
The pamphlet contained both facts and exaggerations. It represented
an unacknowledged fear, then sweeping financial circles in London,
that Britain faced a reduced post-war capacity to function as an
international money market. By scapegoating Australia for its
borrowing programmes, London could defer having to face that
growing reality.
Prime Minister Bruce saw a necessity to answer these distortions
at a dinner given by Australian bankers in London on 15 November
1926. He did this not to defend Lang nor his curtailing the financial
power of the states, but because the Commonwealth would still
require access to the London money market. Bruce remarked that
whereas the British war loans of £7.6 billion were non-reproductive,
the Australian loans were at the height of their productive power.
The Australian railway network constructed with borrowed funds
and far larger than that of Britain's was quoted as an example. He
reminded his listeners that Australia 'bore every penny of her war
effort. She funded and made provision to pay the debt incurred before
any other nation recognised similar obligations'. He remarked that
Australia could manage its own financial affairs and added ominously
that ifnecessary it could 'meet the remainder of her needs elsewhere'.
He enlarged on this point of diminishing British wealth with the
comment that, 'If such is Britain's financial position [of being unable
to lend funds] it is dangerous to Imperial goodwill to have that fact
veiled behind criticisms of Australia's financial policy and against
Australia's credit and stability' .26 Butthe offensive against Australia's
borrowing continued no less in Australia than in Britain and Lang
continued to maintain his defence ofthis important economic facility.

NSW Borrows From United States
The Cooke and Davenport pamphlet was accepted in some circles
as a signal of the decline in the level of British investment funding.
One outcome of this failing was the encouragement Lord Chelmsford
(NSW's Agent-General) gave to Lang to look to the US for fu~ds.
NSW was expecting difficulty in floating a loan in London until the
commencement of the new financial year of 1926-27 when it would
have to renew a loan of £11 million. Not wishing his financial friends
to lose by seeing NSW switching to America, Chelmsford suggested
that the New York loan should be handled through London
agents and thereby 'preserve the good-will of the London
market'. 27 Morgans in New York was found to be too expensive

and NSW accepted an offer from the Equitable Trust for its first US
loan of $US25 million (£5 million).28 Alerted to this news, Dr Page
immediately issued a press statement saying that NSW had obtained
its loan at higher cost than had South Australia for its recent Loan
Council London loan. In seeking not to have NSW perceived as
gaining an advantage operating outside the Loan Council, he failed
to mention that the South Australian loan was for exactly £ 1 million. 29
The Equitable Trust and Lang sough to communicate via the coded
cable circuit used by the Australian Commissioner in New York,
H.R. Denison. Denison reluctantly agreed, but he immediately
reported these events to Bruce to deflect government criticism of his
action.30 Bruce, Page and their bureaucrats could thereby maintain a
surveillance on their NSW foe.
Impressed by the speed and success of this loan, Chelmsford
recommended further loans be raised in the US and W.J. McKell,
Minister for Justice and Assistant Treasurer, was sent from Sydney
to oversee these arrangements. He sailed to the US accompanied by
C.R. Chapman, Under Secretary of the Treasury, on 10 February
1927. The US financial journalists were no less reserved in attacking
Australia's borrowing arrangements than were their British
counterparts. McKell had to spend some time with the editor of the
Wall-Street Journal in particular to correct the published misstatements. A second US loan was arranged for $25 million at the
same rate as the previous one. McKell was impressed by the
efficiency of this New York company. It had its own publicity
department to advertise the loan and then advertised that it had
successfully floated it. The company was eager to maintain links
with NSW and McKell perceived the development of a fruitful
relationship if NSW wished to pursue it. Canada had abandoned
London, finding that the US market could offer loans more cheaply.
This was the fifth US-Australian loan; the previous ones were floated
by Queensland and the Commonwealth.
The prejudice that had been fuelled in London against NSW
remained strong when McKell arrived there on 8 April 1927. This
had affected the sale of the stock from a £4 million loan raised early
in September 1926, some of which was still in the underwriter's
hands. The overdraft at the Westminster Bank exceeded the £5 million
limit and Nivisons held little hope of a loan being floated before the
end of 1927. The hostility of the press was assuaged by McKell
meeting with the editor of the Financial Times and the financial editor
of the London Times both of whom welcomed his information and
explanations because they had not been able to obtain them elsewhere.
To overcome the local antipathy, they urged that full economic
information be provided by NSW in future loan prospectuses. From
these events, McKell perceived the need to maintain a publicity
officer in London to counter the critics of NSW. As a measure for
attracting investors deterred by the adverse publicity, Nivisons urged
McKell to agree to establish sinking funds. One fund would be used
to assist in paying off all future loans at the end of 50 years and the
other would apply to all previous loans raised by NSW. Lord
Chelmsford was also a supporter of a sinking fund. 31 This change
reflected an innovation in the fashions ofBritish Empire loan raisings.
British lenders had always maintained a confidence in the states in
which they invested their money if only from the frequent reports in
British newspapers of Australian happenings and they never
questioned that their loans would be repaid. NSW maintained a Debt
Commission that assisted in redeeming loans. Having to establish a
sinking fund to accommodate every loan had been perceived to be
unnecessary until then.
The demands ofNivisons to alter these policies probably sprang
as much from the firm's concerns about the growing political
tensions in NSW, associated with Lang's controversial
leadership, as much as from the increasing uncertainty that

was coming to mark developments in British financial affairs. After
Lang had agreed to establish the sinking fund,32 Nivisons floated a
loan of £12,500,000; £6 million was new money, the remainder
converted. The loan was oversubscribed by £1,500,000. McKell's
public relations activities assisted in this successful float. He
addressed a dinner arranged by the Westminster Bank for financiers,
bankers and financial editors on 26 April and subsequently had his
speech published for distribution to holders of stock due for
conversion and to leading brokersY The anti-Australian elements in
London asserted that the Australian debt was so large that Australia
(and NSW) were unable to even pay the interest on it and that the
new loans raised in London were actually used to pay the interest
bill on that huge debt. McKell took pains to demonstrate in his speech
how untrue were such lies. He explained that the interest bill on the
NSW loans was £ 10,600,000 and that the amount of interest eamed
by the government's facilities such as the railways, the water and
sewerage services and the harbour trust amounted to £8,600,000.
The balance of £2,000,000, he indicated, could be provided from
consolidated revenue. 34 The event demonstrated how insubstantial
criticisms could devalue the State's credit and how expert rebuttal
of it could quickly restore financial confidence.

Commonwealth Government Captures States'
Finances
Bruce and Page proposed significant changes to the financial affairs
of Australia's governments in 1926. They had reduced income
taxation over the previous three years by 42 per cent while witnessing
a doubling in their customs revenue from the tariff and excise duties.
The Commonwealth enjoyed a surplus revenue of £7 million in 192425. The Commonwealth's payments to the states had remained fixed
at 25 shillings per head since 1910. In spite of this growing affluence
Bruce and Page proposed at the Premiers' conference in Melbourne
on 24 May 1926 the cancellation of the 25 shilling payment to the
states and allow them to take over the collection of all income
taxation. The Commonwealth would retain the tariff and excise
income. The Premiers opposed this programme. William McKell
represented NSW and remarked on how the Commonwealth enjoyed
surplus revenues while NSW had an average deficit over the previous
decade of £3,186,000. Dr Page refused to back down and the Premiers
met again on 21 June 1926 in Melbourne with Lang attending this
time. It would be better for the Commonwealth if it was interested in
better govemment, Lang remarked, to take over the education systems
of the states and conduct them to the satisfaction of the people and
retain the per capita payments altogether. 35 He declared on his return
to Sydney that:
When the per capita payments cease the States will be utterly at the
mercy of the Federal Treasurer. The structure of the State finances
will be completely undermined, our credit imperilled, and effective
State sovereignty gone. 36
Bruce and Page halted their radical measure for a time but then
resumed their plan on 2 March 1927 by reviving the bill before
Parliament. The per capita payments were to cease in June 1927 and
states receive grants equal to the amounts lost just for that year. Nine
government members joined with the ALP in opposing this drastic
change, but the government still had sufficient numbers to have the
bill enacted. 37

The Bruce-Page Plan and the Establishment of the
Permanent Loan Council
Spurred on by this success against the states, Bruce and Page then
introduced measures to convert the temporary loan council
into a permanent one and to take over the existing state debts.

The per capita payment of £7.6 million would be used to discharge
these debts and any additional debt payments would have to be paid
by the st~tes. Lang expressed considerable concern about the plans
of Bruce and Page as follows:
The Commonwealth should not ask the sovereign States to give up
their rights and hand themselves over, shackled hand and foot, to a
loan council which, in effect, will be a Commonwealth authority. I
judge from what has happened in the past what is likely to occur in
th~ future. If the Commonwealth has these extended powers I do
not think it will hesitate to use them. For these reasons I must state
definitely that I entirely object to bind New South Wales to a Loan
Council, and for me to agree to the insertion of such a provision in
the Constitution would be practically to betray the sovereign rights
of the State of New South Wales. 38
NSW remained aloof from all these discussions. Lang's
opposition to the Bruce-Page plan had been clearly enunciated. If
Lang's government had continued in office Bruce and Page would
have had to amend their financial plans significantly ifnot abandon
them. Lang was preoccupied with internal political affairs and
probably saw little need to give the Agreement any priority. However
general elections were held in NSW on 8 October 1927 which Lang's
government lost by a small majority. Bruce and Page would have
rejoiced with the removal of the single obstruction to making the
Commonwealth paramount in national financial affairs. Bruce
immediately enlisted the support of the new Premier, Thomas Bavin,
and the Financial Agreement Act was passed in March 1928. The
constitutional change was approved at a referendum on 17 November
1928. The sole opposition to this was led by Lang.
Jack Lang was the sole Premier to hold out against the plans by
Bruce and Page to remove all financial powers from the states and
to make them appendages of the Commonwealth. Bruce and Page
had no experience of state leadership or politics. Their model was
one of small government, national expansion through corporate or
private investment and accepting guidance from British financial
circles. Their philosophies were not far distant from those informing
neo-liberalism in the late 1990s. Lang was able to stand up to Bruce
and Page because he governed the largest state economy and he
refused to conform to an economic model he knew to be unworkable
if a federal system was to be retained. If a unitary model of
government were to be established he would have supported a change,
but he knew that was not on the Nationalist's agenda. When he came
to form his second government in November 1930, the Great
Depression was in full swing. The Australian commodity prices had
seriously declined and this added to years of the Bruce-Page
deflationary tactics and reductions in the loan council borrowings
made the impact of the Depression all the more devastating. How
Lang attempted to maintain the independence ofNSW in the face of
those changes lies outside the range of this chapter, except to note
that he was utterly defeated in attempting to reverse the changes that
Bruce and Page had imposed on the federation. Nor could he reverse
Australia sliding further into the Great Depression.
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